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Introduction
At the end of January, 2011, the Commission finished its report and concluded: "the greatest tragedy would be to accept the refrain that no one could have seen this coming and thus find nothing could have been done. If we accept this notion, it will happen again." The Commission also concluded that the financial crisis was an "avoidable" disaster caused by widespread failures in government regulation, corporate mismanagement and heedless risk-taking by Wall Street. It found that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had failed to require big banks to hold more capital to cushion potential losses and to halt risky practices and that the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank "neglected its mission by failing to stem the tide of toxic mortgages" (Chan 2011 ). The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (Commission) was a tenmember commission appointed by the U.S. government with the goal of investigating the causes of the financial crisis of 2007-2010. Citing dramatic breakdowns in corporate governance including taking on too much risk, the Commission portrayed incompetence with the following examples. Citigroup executive conceded that they paid little attention to mortgage-related risks. Executives at American International Group were blind to its $79 billion exposure to credit-default swaps. Merrill Lynch managers were surprised when seemingly secure mortgage investments suddenly suffered huge losses. The banks hid their excessive leverage with derivatives, off-balance-sheet entities and other accounting tricks. Their speculations were aided by a giant "shadow banking system" in which banks relied heavily on short-term debt. The Commission concluded: "when the housing and mortgage markets cratered, the lack of transparency, the extraordinary debt loads, the short-term loans and the risky assets all came home to roost" (Chan 2011) . Also, the Commission had cited another avoidable failure, the inconsistent treatment by the U.S. federal government in helping to bail out Bear Stearns in March, 2008 but letting Lehman Brothers go into bankruptcy in September, 2008. Thus, the focus of this paper is to assess the risk management and corporate governance of both banks to see if this inconsistent treatment by the federal government was justified.
Risk Management Assessment
The last annual financial statements ever reported both for Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were as of To help assess the risk management of both firms, their condensed balance sheets were compiled and analyzed in Tables A and B for 2003 and 2007. A major problem was the traditional lack of classified balance sheets for banks. No current and long-term categories of assets and liabilities are typically provided by banks. For guidance, the following comments of a Lehman Brothers' Atlanta office manager, who retired early at age 55, may be considered. In an interview, he said that over the years, the firm's culture had shifted from managing money for clients to proprietary trading for itself. A permissive management style increasingly favored short-term investment gains and unrealized profits through mark-to-market accounting over the sustainability of the company. He said: "the firm traded at the expense of the customers in some cases and on the trading desk, there was almost disdain for the customer" (Lewis 2011 ). This strategy was reinforced by Lehman Brothers' change in its balance sheet terminology for its investments from "Securities" in 2003 (as a brokerage firm for its customers) to "Financial Instruments" in 2007 (as a trading firm for its own shareholders and management). Thus, such investments were classified as short-term assets in 2003 and as long-term assets in 2007 for both firms to summarize this strategic shift in investment banking over this period in Tables A  and B . The European Parliament, the SEC, and the FASB in the U.S. have all "carved out" (eliminated) mark-to-market accounting for such asset investments of all public banks in the European Union and the United States. Such "carve outs" may be a threat to the widespread use of International Financial Reporting Standards.
Comments: Bear Stearns only had 3% capital at the time of its bankruptcy rescue. The Basel III agreement recommended at least 7%. The Swiss National Bank recommends 20%. The European Community is considering 15% to 20%. The Dodd-Frank Act recommends "adequate" capital. The old Glass Seagal Act stipulated 10% capital. At the time of the financial crisis in the U.S., the largest 19 U.S. banks averaged 3%. Why were there no "going concern" audit opinions when less than 1 year later, the TARP program provided $700 billion in bailout funds to these largest U.S. banks? Also, if Lehman Brothers had been Lehman Sisters, it's bankruptcy never would have happened! Note: Only a 3.6% write-down of long-term (toxic) assets shows a possible bankruptcy at Lehman Brothers! The U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission reported similar percentages for major U.S. banks in 2008. The European Parliament, the SEC, and the FASB in the U.S. have all "carved out" (eliminated) mark-to-market accounting for such asset investments of all public banks in the European Union and the United States. Such "carve outs" may be a threat to the widespread use of International Financial Reporting Standards.
Comments: Lehman Brothers only had 3% capital at the time of its bankruptcy. The Basel III agreement recommended at least 7%. The Swiss National Bank recommends 20%. The European Community is considering 15% to 20%. The old Glass Seagal Act stipulated 10% capital. At the time of the financial crisis in the U.S., the largest 19 U.S. banks averaged 3%. Why were there no "going concern" audit opinions when less than 1 year later, the TARP program provided $700 billion in bailout funds to these largest U.S. banks? Also, if Lehman Brothers had been Lehman Sisters, it's bankruptcy never would have happened! Both firms were under-capitalized in both 2007 at 4% each and in 2007 at 3% each. The Basel III agreement recommended at least 7%. The Swiss National Bank recommends 20% and the European Community is considering 15% to 20%. The Glass Seagal Act, which was overturned in 1999, stipulated a 10% capital requirement. At the time of the 2008 financial crisis in the U.S., the largest 19 banks had only 3% capital. Afterwards, the capital percentage went up close to 10% but has now fallen back to about 6%. Note that only a 3.6% write-down of mortgage-backed or other toxic investments would eliminate all the capital of Lehman Brothers as would a 3.8% write-down for Bear Stearns.
The Commission reported similar percentages for major U.S. banks in 2008. The European Parliament, the SEC, and the FASB have all "carved out" (eliminated) mark-to-market accounting for such asset investments of all public banks in the European Union and the United States. Such "carve-outs" may be a threat to the widespread use of the International Financial Reporting Standards. In summary, both firms had very similar balance sheet percentages and ratios in 2003 and 2007. Recently, the Obama administration made the decision to let big banks recapitalize as the economy recovered along with dividend increases and high bonus payouts. "As the recovery stalls, this strategy looks increasingly dubious because the banks' equity capital levels are now probably too low to buffer the shock of another down leg (Johnson 2011 Also, high leverage (debt to equity) levels were associated with high levels of banks' risk taking and poor financial performance in these studies. When implementing the $700 billion bailout of major U.S. banks, the U.S. Treasury did not replace any existing bank Board members but added new Directors to represent taxpayer interests. Many of these original Directors oversaw the big banks and brokerage firms when they were taking huge risks during the real estate boom. A corporate government specialist concluded: "these boards had no idea about the risks these firms were taking on and relied on management to tell them" (Barr 2008) . A senior corporate governance analyst said: "this financial crisis is a direct result of the compensation practices at these Wall Street firms" (Lohr 2008 
Corporate governance for risk management and company oversight was very weak at both banks as shown by the following red flags which were cited in the empirical research on corporate governance in banks:
• CEO Duality: At Bear Stearns, the CEO, James Cayne, had also been the Chairmen of the Board (COB) for the last seven years. At Lehman Brothers, the CEO, Richard Fudd, had also been the COB for the last seventeen years. • Opaque Disclosures: Per the SEC chairman and SEC chief accountant, there was a direct line from the implosion of Enron to the fall of Lehman Brothers which was an inability for investors to get sound financial information necessary for making sound investment decisions. This meant resisting any calls to repeal the current mark-to-market standards and also meant expanding the requirement to disclose the securities positions and loan commitments of all financial institutions. There was no fair value reporting at either bank which would have provided the information investors needed to make informed decisions, and bring much needed transparency to the market.
Conclusions: Risk Management, Corporate Governance, and Other Observations
Our analyses show that both companies had weak risk management and corporate governance practices. They seemed to be in similar, very weak financial positions. Bear Stearns bailout may have been helped by Wall Street connections, like Henry Paulsen, the U.S. Treasury Secretary and former CEO of Goldman Sachs. However, possibly the federal government later thought that Lehman Brothers was "too big to save" since it was twice the size of Bear Stearns. Then, after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy ignited the world financial crisis, the federal government reversed its thinking and bailed out the largest 19 U.S. banks since they were now "too big to fail." This bailout occurred despite the fact that all these banks had received unqualified audit opinions on their financial statements and internal controls in their last annual reports before the bailout. No "going concern" qualified audit opinions were issued for possible bankruptcies in these banks and audit opinions appear not to be a tool for assessing the risk management of such banks. Thus, it appeared that there was inconsistent and unjustified treatment by the U.S. At a 2011 Town Hall discussion, entitled Does Wall Street Really Run the World?, Lynn Turner, the former SEC Chief Accountant, made the following comments. "There was greater attention to risk management when Wall Street firms were partnerships with individual partner liability twenty years ago versus today as corporations (similar to the evolution of Big 4 Accounting firms). Wall Street firms changed from raising money for corporations and being investment brokerage firms to a new emphasis on trading for its own sake and their own shareholders.
An eleven trillion market cap destruction occurred from the economic crisis of 2008. These firms were not really creating value but were selling toxic investments such that a Rolling Stone reporter nicknamed Goldman Sachs the Vampire Squid. Paul Volcker has commented that the last real innovation of Wall Street banks was the ATM thirty years ago, actually by a Nebraska bank." Also, the chairman of the International Accounting Standards Board had commented that the fraudulent financial reporting problems of this century were really failures in corporate governance (Tweedie 2007 ). There may have been audit problems as well since both companies received unqualified or "clean" opinions on their 2007 financial statements and internal controls even though both companies had solvency issues since Bear Stearns was bailed out and Lehman Brothers went bankrupt.
Risk management at the major U.S. (bailout) banks was very poor and contributed significantly to the U.S. financial crisis which started with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In March 2010, the SEC started requiring all publicly traded companies in the U.S. to provide disclosures that describe the Board's role in risk oversight. Such disclosures were required in the annual proxy statements of these firms. In July 2010, the Federal Financial Reform (Dodd-Frank) Act was signed into law. It mandates risk committees for Boards of financial institutions and other entities that the Federal Reserve Bank oversees.
The following interview with Satyajit Das, an international respected expert on finance with over 30 years of working experience in the industry, provides comments on risk management and corporate governance in the banking industry: Few bank officers and Directors from the financial crisis have yet been found liable under either state or federal law. The Lehman Brothers' CEO and top executives did owe $90 million in fines which were covered by insurance. Also, many directors from Bear Stearns (six), Lehman Brothers (six), and Enron (seven) continue to serve on other Boards. The "old boy" network is emphasized here as is the decline in importance of reputation on Wall Street. Prior bad conduct simply is not viewed as a problem (Davidoff, 2011) .
"As banks expanded you exhausted the pool of people who you could lend to and then moved onto the others-until you came to people who couldn't ever really pay you back. So the trick was to hide or get rid of the risk of non-payment---it became a case of NMP (not my problem
In response to an email about this issue of why Bear Stearns was saved and Lehman Brothers let go into bankruptcy, Lynn Turner replied: "Both were highly risky with very, very arrogant CEOs and chairmen. Neither had a great board but Bear Stearns may have had better connections on their board and in this instance, Lehman Brothers being second was fatal. Both depended way too much on very short term financing, including overnight commercial paper or repo's---a very ill advised and highly risky strategy for any company let alone one with very little capital. 
Lehman Brothers Board of Directors
Michael Ainslie, age 64, and director since 1996 is a private investor and former President and CEO of Sotheby's Holdings. He was formerly the Chief Operating Officer of N-Ren Corp., a Cincinnati-based chemical manufacturer, and formerly the President of Palmas Del Mar, a real estate development company. He serves on the Audit Committee.
John Akers, age 73, and director since 1996 is a private investor and the retired Chairman of the Board and CEO of IBM. He is a Director of W.R. Grace and Co. and serves as the Chairman of the Compensation Committee and as a member of the Finance and Risk Committee.
